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Priority setting in radiation policy is complex because it depends to a large extent on risk
perception. It has been shown repeatedly that the public is much more sensitive to potential
harmful sequelae of radiation than to those of other environmental pollutants. Thus, cancer risk,
particularly at low doses, has become a sociopolitical issue. The principle that radiation causes
cancer, is life shortening, and causes an array of other pathologic disorders, is well accepted yet
the quantification of sequelae at the lower end point of the dose-response curve is still
controversial. The presence of a significant carcinogenic effect at very low doses has strong
financial implications. Sociopolitical and economic values play a major role in the interpretation of
available data. Thus, the use of nuclear energy is a function of risk/benefit, pressures, available
alternatives, and cost. Three case studies-nuclear plant workers, children irradiated for
an essentially benign condition, and food safety-are used to illustrate polar policy decisions.
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Health policy may be defined as a series of
decision processes focusing on two issues:
resource allocation and regulation (1). To
make the correct decision in such a frame-
work (which usually means a 70:30 break-
down on the average) we need data to
establish priorities and compute benefit
versus risk ratios.
Priority setting in radiation policy
is complex because it depends to a large
extent on risk perception. It has been
shown repeatedly that the public is much
more sensitive to potential harmful
sequelae of radiation than to those of
other environmental pollutants such as
smoking (2). The reason for this disso-
nance may be that whereas self-poisoning
by smoking is voluntary, radiation is
attributed to the government or "the
establishment" in general. Thus, cancer
risk, particularly at low levels, has become
a sociopolitical issue.
Decision-making Models
The considerations involved in formulating
policy may be illustrated by two sets of
models. Ifwe first consider regulation, we
have four theoretical situations: ++ (posi-
tive-positive)/- - (negative-negative)/+ -
(positive-negative)/- + (negative-positive)
as illustrated in Figure 1.
In fact, only the upper left quadrant is
involved in the decision process, as all oth-
ers are irrelevant: There are no harmless
substances and we are not interested in
items providing no benefit.
The principle that radiation causes
cancer, is life shortening, and causes an
array ofother pathologic disorders, is well
accepted but the quantification ofsequelae
at the lower end point ofthe dose-response
curve is still controversial. Therefore it is of
utmost importance to have valid data on
the potential hazard oflow-dose radiation.
Let us not forget that in contrast with the
delivery of high-dose irradiation used
either for severe illness or by the military,
delivery oflow-dose radiation is generally
under our control.
The issue of low-dose radiation
carcinogenesis has come to the forefront
of debate with the slowly accumulating
data on excess leukemia near nuclear
installations in the United Kingdom,
where a significantly increased incidence
of leukemia was observed in the West
Berkshire area among children younger
than 5 years ofage and limited to an area
< 10 km from the nuclear plant (3-5).
Gardner et al. (6) related the excess to an
apparent genetic effect through paternal
exposure. Subsequent studies in other
British locations and elsewhere failed to
confirm this notion (7-9), which suggests
that other factors such as an occasional
higher radiation discharge, chemical car-
cinogens, or contaminated paternal cloth-
ing or dust played a much stronger role in
the reported leukemogenesis than ionizing
radiation. Incidentally, such an excess was
noted in areas where nuclear plants were
planned but never constructed (10).
Practically any regulatory process is a
function of economic considerations. In
our case alternate energy options are avail-
able, e.g., oil or coal. Because the presence
of a significant carcinogenic effect at very
low radiation doses would have strong
financial implications, sociopolitical and
economic values play a major role in the
interpretation ofavailable data and blur the
assessment of available information. In
other words, the use ofnuclear energy is a
function ofavailable alternatives and cost.
Let us now consider our second policy
model, which is illustrated in Figure 2.
Again, we deal with four plus and minus
options but in this model all four quadrants
are ofinterest. However, the most problem-
atic quadrant is in the upper right. The
financial deficit results primarily from the
continuous technological development that
strains our life system. In an era when the
principles of a welfare society are often
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Figure 1. A schematic representation of the prevailing Figure 2. A schematic representation of the prevailing
alternatives in control of drugs, biologicals, and other alternatives in control of resource allocation.
health conditions.
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disregarded, the missing resources must
come from the apparently redundant lower
left quadrant-an unworkable scenario.
In a setting ofthis kind one must consider
the construction ofa Great Wall ofChina
around each nuclear plant versus more
urgent health needs such as high-tech drugs.
Then the question of who makes
the decision arises. Who will face various
pressure groups and make decisions that
will lead to an appropriate resource alloca-
tion and enable utilization ofradiation for
peaceful health purposes and who is going
to payfor it?
Presidents and prime ministers are rarely
awakened in the middle ofthe night when
an urgent decision bearing social implica-
tions must be made. Such decisions are usu-
ally undertaken by a lower-level official who
is willing to accept the responsibility and
is supported by the hierarchy, but who
frequently lacks sufficient background data.
Case Studies
I would like to illustrate the issue with
two types of case studies-one in an
industrial setting and the other relating to
medical treatment.
There is hardly any dispute that
radiation carcinogenesis has no threshold.
Therefore, workers employed in nuclear
energy must carry a potential, even ifinfin-
itesimal, excess risk. As radiation-induced
cancer has no unique characteristics in
terms oftissue or cell type, there is no way
to distinguish patients who develop cancer
due to the radiation treatment from those
who would have developed it anyway. Thus,
with increasing age the differential portion
of cancer among the workers that can be
attributed to radiation becomes smaller,
while more persons who were irradiated in
the past claim causality and compensation.
Unions, supported by interest groups,
repeatedly claim compensation for indi-
viduals who develop on-the-job cancer.
The employers, mostly governments,
object on the basis ofpoor scientific sup-
port, claiming that the risk ofdeveloping
cancer in middle-aged persons is due pri-
marily to other factors. Numerous such
cases are still subjudice.
The second example involves legislation
based on long-term follow up ofan essen-
tiallyhealthy irradiated population. Between
1948 and 1960, nearly 20,000 children
originating from North Africa and the
Middle East were treated in Israel by radia-
tion for ringworm ofthe scalp as part ofa
widespread public health campaign to
eradicate the condition. In 1965 a compre-
hensive investigation ofthe delayed effects
ofthis X-ray therapy was initiated by our
group (11).
The study cohort included 10,834
irradiated subjects, 10,834 nonirradiated
population comparison subjects, and 5392
nonirradiated siblings. The mean year of
irradiation was 1956 and the mean age at
irradiation was 7.1 years.
Several sets offollow-up data from this
population showed that the irradiated
subjects had a significantly elevated risk of
cancer ofthe head and neck, with an over-
all relative risk of 2. Meningiomas were
outstandingly increased (relative risk>10)
(12). A dose response was demonstrated,
but ofparticular interest was the excess of
thyroid and breast cancer despite the low
doses delivered to these organs (13,14).
In this particular case the government
accepted responsibility for the supposedly
beneficial radiation treatment that was
initiated in good faith but proved detri-
mental. Truly, the ultimate motive for leg-
islation might not have been devoid of
political considerations. Nevertheless, each
individual who can provide proofofirradi-
ation during the period under considera-
tion, either in Israel or en route, and who
developed head or neck cancer, is now
being financially compensated.
This law is extremely liberal. Because
the average age of the irradiated popu-
lation today is close to 50 years of age
(ranging from 37 to 60), approximately
two out of every three compensated per-
sons would have contracted cancer even if
not irradiated.
The difference in policy between this
group and those employed in the nuclear
industry is rooted in the working principle
that unwilling and unknowing exposure to
a deleterious agent must be compensated.
Conclusion
Obviously, both models are schematic. In
real life a third factor representing pres-
sures-political, economic, or social-
intervenes in the decision-making process.
In the case of nuclear plants, the apparent
benefit outweighs the potential harm.
Economic pressures tilt in the direction of
establishing the plant by minimizing the
potential harm and applying adequate
protective measures. Similarly, considering
needs and resources, economic pressures
push policy forward into effect unless
strongly opposed by citizen groups.
By the same token, in the case of
massive scalp irradiation ofchildren for an
essentially benign condition, overeagerness
to treat promotes a positive vector when
harm versus benefit is assessed. This notion
probably affected the decision-making
process at the time, to compensate for the
lack ofsufficient resources.
Both of these decisions were made
almost 40 years ago. If one attempted to
simulate a theoretical decision ofthis kind
today, only one ofthe two (i.e., the one to
start a nuclear plant) would survive, as eco-
nomic powers opposition and strict radia-
tion protection appears to minimize the
risk. On the other hand, we know much
much more today about delayed risks of
head irradiation to children in terms of
cancer and brain damage (11-13).
Finally, the recent controversy with
regard to commercial application offood
irradiation may provide an appropriate up-
to-date example and illustrate the general
validity ofour model. Food irradiation can
retard spoilage and kill pathogenic bacteria
without retaining radioactivity or changing
texture, taste, and appearance. Nevertheless,
pressures applied by environmental groups
have delayed the full approval ofthis process
bythe U.S. Food and DrugAdministration.
Thus, in model terms we have a positive
needs/positive resources/negative pressure
situation. Furthermore, the balance of
potential economic benefit versus minimal
but potential harm (cancer risk to radiation
workers) is strongly tilted by negative
consumer pressures.
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